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SC-NCJ-049/94 BIL

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MAJOR SOVIET UNITS RETURNING TO THE USSR. THE GALY DIVISION KNOWN TO HAVE LEFT THE CSSR IS THE 35TH CMRD WHICH RETURNED TO HUNAGRY. BY COMPARISON, THERE HAVE EEEN CONTINUED REPORTS THAT WESTWARD MOVEMENT CONTINUES FROM AT LEAST THE BALTIC, BELORUSSIN, AND CARPATHIAN SOME OF THIS MOVEMENT OBVIOUSLY HAS BEEN RESUPPLY OF THOSE UNITS DEPLOYED TO THE FORWARD AREA, BUT THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS - SUCH AS THE SIGHTINGS OF TANKS, ARTILLERY PIECES, AND COMEAT ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT - NHICH POINT TO A CONTINUED BUILD-UP IN THE FORWARD AREA, ESPECIALLY IN EAST GERMANY. CONSEQUESTLY, THE LONGER SOVIET FORCES NOT ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED TO THE FORWARD AREA CONTINUE TO BE LOCATED THERE, THE LONGER THE THREAT TO NATO EXISTS AND THE STRONGER IT BECOMES. SOME OF THE FACTORS WHICH INDICATE OR FAVOR WARSAW PACT OFFENSIVE ACTION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

NO MAJOR UNITS HAVE RETURNED TO THE USSR. WARSAW PACT FORCES CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN MORE THAN AMPLE TO NEUTRALIZE CZECHOSLOVAKIA REMAIN THEREIN.

CESPITE SOME REPORTS OF LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS, SSUUPPLIES HAVE CONTINUEDD TTO FLOW AND SERVE THOSE DEPLOYED WITS IN QUANTITITES APPARENTLY CONSISTENT FOR SUSTAINED CPERATIONS.

D. THE CALL-UP OF RESERVISTS APPARENTLY CONTINUES WITH CILY LLIMITED INDICATIONS OF RELEASING THOSE

ALREADY CALLED UP.

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E. THE INEAL ANCE OF FORCES OPPOSING CENTAGE CONTINUES, AND NEW DIVISIONS ARE BEING RELOCATED IN CENTRAL EAST GERMANY, INDICATEING AT LEAST A RESTORATION OF THE PRE-MAY CAPABILITY AGAINST NORTHAG AND BERLIN WITHOUT DIMINISHING THE CENTAGE THREAT.

F. THE CONTINUATION OF GOOD OPERATIONS WEATHER FOR

AT LEAST ONE MCRE MONTH.

G. THE LACK OF NATO REACTION TO THE CZECH INVASION.
H. THE NATO REDUCTION OF FORCES TREND.
1. THE PREOCCUPATION BY THE UNITED STATES WHITH VIET NAM WITH NO SIGN OF PROGRESS FROM THE PARIS TALKS. J. THE DISUNITY OF THE US AND THE FREE WORLD OPINIONS OVER MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN VIET NAM.

K. THE EASE OF THE CZECH OCCUPATION DUE PARTLY TO DUECEK'S URGING COMPLIANCE WITH THE SOVIETS 9c C




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TO USAREUR WEEKLY ADDRESSEES

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SECTION FINAL OF TWO

L. TYE PREPONDERANCE OF ARMOR IN WARSAW PACT DE-PLOYMENTS ADJACENT TO FRG-CZECH PORDER IS CONSISTENT WITH SOVIET OFFENSIVE OFFENSIVE DOCTRINE.

M. RECENT MILITARY MOVEMENTS ARE TOWARD REPLIN, WEST GERMANY, RUMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA, RATHER THAN IN

THE OTHER DIRECTION. 4. DESPITE THE INCREASE OF FORCES IN POTH EAST GERMANY AND CZICHOSLOVAKIA, THERE IS NO CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT WARSAW PACT FORCES AGE PREPARING FOR AM OFFENSIVE THAT WARDAW FAUL CONCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HOWEVER, A ACAINST NATO FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF THRICATORS CAN NOT BE DENIED. SOULET DEPLOY-O WINTS INTO THE FORWARD AREA NOW REPRESENT THE MEAVIEST IN ESTMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCE OUTSIDE THE USSR SINCE WORLD WAR II. IN SPITE OF WHAT WUST BE AN OBVIOUS FACT THAT MATO INTENDS MO REACTION TO THE ZECH INVASION, TYIS DEPLOYMENT CONTINUES. EXTENSIVE RESERVIST CALL-MOVILIZATION OF GIVILIAN TRAMSPORT AND RESUPPLY OF SOUE 30 SOVIET DIVISIONS WHICH ARE FAR PROT HOME STATIONS MUST ADD UP TO A SEVERE DRAIN ON THE SOUIET ECCHOMY AND BUDGET. THIS HUSE AND COSTLY INVESTMENT IS IN PLACE TO BE FURTHER EXPLOITED WHILE THE OPPORTURITY EXISTS.
THEREFORE, THE LONGER THE PRESENT RUILD-UP REVAINS IN PLACE, THE MORE THE PROPABILITY INCREASES THAT FURTHER OFFERSIVE ACTION WILL TAKE PLACE. THIS ACTION COULS RE DIRECTED AGAINST LIMITED OF JECTIVES SUCH AS ONE OR ALL OF THE SALKAN COUNTRIES CRUNANIA, YUSOSLAVIA, ALBANIA), AUSTRIA OR WEST PERLIN. THE CAPADILITY HAS ALSO I'L RIASED TO CORDUCT AN OFFERSIVE COR OFFERSIVES) INTO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. PART II - POLITICAL SITUATION THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE PRESENTLY SURROUDING THE

5. THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE PRESENTLY SURROUDING THE BERLIN AND WEST GERMAN QUESTIONS CONTINUES TO BE TEMSE LARGELY BECAUSE OF MOSCOW'S PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER

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THE COUTCILL OF THIS AMPAIGN IS TO DEFLECT ATTENTION AWAY FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND OTYFR PARTS OF EASTERN EURO E OR TO PREPARE A JUSTIFICATION FOR AGGRESSIVE ACTION AGAINST SERLIN AND/OR WEST GERMANY. IT IS ALSO UNCLEAR HOW FAR SUCH ASCRESSIVE ACTION MIGHT GO, IF UNDERTAKEN. THE WEST GERMAN PARLIAMENTARY MEST-INGS SCYEDULED TO BE HELD IN WEST BERLIN FROM 25 OCTOPER TO I HOVE THE COU PARTY CONGRESS TO TAKE PLACE THERE DURING THE PERIOD 4-8 MOVEMBER CAN BE EXPECTED TO TRIGGER A SOVIETYEAST GERMA" REACTION. IN VIEW OF THE PROCACLY DE MORE VIGOROUS THAN THOSE REPORTED ZARLIES THIS YEAR AND LAS YEAR. FURTHER, THE IRRATIONAL SOLIET ACTION IN CZECHOALOVAKIA PROVIDES A PRECEDENT FOR EVEN MORE SERIOUS ACTION AGAINST BERLIN OR WEST GERMANY. FOR EVEN MORE 6. HOWEVER, FROM THE POLITICAL, IDEALOGICAL AND SCONOMIC POINTS OF VIEW, RUNAMIA AND YUGOSLAVIA MUST HAVE GREATER IMPORTANCE FOR SOVIET PLANNIES THAN SERLIM AND WEST GERMANY. THE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS OF THESE OMCE-LOYAL MEMPERS OF THE SOVIET BLOC ARE OF THE SAME SORT WHICH APPEARED TO PROVOKE SOVIET MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE CSR. BOTH OF THESE BALKAN COUNTRIES ARE SEEKING INCPEASINGLY
TO DRAW ON WESTERN INDUSTRIAL ASSISTANCE AND TRADE,
THERESY REDUCING THEIR ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OF MOSCOW;
AND YUGOSLAV COMMUNIST IDELOLGY IS IN SOME RESPECTS EVEN MORE HERETICAL THAT THAT OF THE AZECHS. FINALLY, YUGOSLAVIA AND RUMANIA COULD BE OCCUPIED MILITARILY; WITH FAR LESS RISK OF A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST THAN SUCH AN ACTION AGAINST BERLIN OR WEST GERMANY WOULD ENTAIL. FOR THESE REASONS, AN INTERVENTION IN THE TWO RALKAN COUNTRIES CAND PROPABLY ALPAVIA AS WELLD THE TWO MALKAN COUNTRIES (AND PHOLARE) ALVANIA AS WELL)
IS THE MORE PLAUSIBLE SUBJECT OF CURRENT SOVIET
PLANNING. IF THIS IS THE CASE, SEVERE HARASSMENT OF
BERLIN COULD SERVE AS A SCREENING ACTION UNTIL THE OCCUPATION OF THE RALKANS IS COMPLETED CUPATION OF THE BALKANS IS COMPLETED

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(SC-NLJ-049/94 315